WE GUARANTEE THE SHIZ-NIT 100%
According to the dictionary THE SHIZ-NIT Rules! (And what dictionary lies?)
THE SHIZ-NIT:
1) Something really cool
2) Used to express joy in something or someone
3) To express that something is really or very good
1) Yo man this roller coaster is THE SHIZ-NIT!
2) Dang! I can't believe you stood up to that bully, you're THE SHIZ-NIT
3) This pizza is THE SHIZ -NIT!
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=the%20shiznit
FINE PRINT (On Lying and Deceiving)
LYING:
1) noun: the telling of lies, or false statements; untruthfulness
2) adjective: telling or containing lies; deliberately untruthful; deceitful; false
Lying isn't a sign of moral depravity (except when it is). Lying is a sign of cognitive advancement. It requires a fertile and high-functioning brain to take something as simple as the truth and twist it, palming off the deception on someone else with the earnestness of a choirboy. The problem with the truth is that it doesn't always serve our purposes, further our careers or keep us out of trouble. When you can take the route made of imagination, best-case scenarios and wish fulfillment, you'd be nuts not to take a deceitful stroll toward your goals, right?
This fine print challenges our customer's recent defense of THE SHIZ'S' rights to deceive customers (1). Customer maintains there is a general moral difference between lying and intentional deception: while THE SHIZ has a prima facie duty not to lie, there is no such obligation to avoid deception. This fine print argues 1) that an examination of cases shows that lying and deception are often morally equivalent, and 2) that the customer's position is premised on a species of moral functionalism that misconstrues the nature of moral obligation. Against the customer, it is argued that both lying and intentional deception are wrong where they infringe a customer's right to autonomy or his/her right to be treated with dignity. These rights represent 'deontological constraints' on action, defining what we must not do whatever the functional value of the consequences. THE SHIZ'S ethics must recognise such constraints if it so to contribute to the moral integrity of All Purpose Cleaner practice.
We've known how to lie with statistics for 50 years now. What we really need are theory and praxis for accusing someone else of lying with statistics. THE SHIZ'S experience with the response to "The Bell Curve" has led us to suspect that such a formulation already exists, probably imparted during a secret initiation for professors in the social sciences. This article represents our best attempt to reconstruct what must be in it.
Is THE SHIZ-NIT bound by just the same constraints as everyone else in regard to honesty? What, anyway, does honesty require? Telling no lies? Avoiding intentional deception by whatever means? From a utilitarian standpoint lying would seem to be on the same footing as other forms of intentional deception: yielding the same consequences. But utilitarianism fails to explain the wrongness of lying. THE SHIZ like everyone else, have a "prima facie" duty not to lie – but again like everyone else, they are not duty-bound to avoid intentional deception, lying apart; except where it would involve a breach of trust.
An organism may use misinformation, knowingly (through deception) or unknowingly (as in the case of camouflage), to gain advantage in a competitive environment. From an evolutionary perspective, greater tactical deception occurs among primates closer to humans, with larger neocortices. In humans, the onset of deceptive behaviors in childhood exhibits a developmental trajectory, which may be regarded as 'normal' in the majority and deficient among a minority with certain neurodevelopmental disorders (e.g. autism). In the human adult, deception and lying exhibit features consistent with their use of 'higher' or 'executive' brain systems. Accurate detection of deception in humans may be of particular importance in forensic practice, while an understanding of its cognitive neurobiology may have implications for models of 'theory of mind' and social cognition, and societal notions of responsibility, guilt and mitigation. In recent years, functional neuroimaging techniques (especially functional magnetic resonance imaging) have been used to study deception. Though few in number, and using very different experimental protocols, studies published in the peer-reviewed literature exhibit certain consistencies. Attempted deception is associated with activation of executive brain regions (particularly prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices), while truthful responding has not been shown to be associated with any areas of increased activation (relative to deception). Hence, truthful responding may comprise a relative 'baseline' in human cognition and communication. The subject who lies may necessarily engage 'higher' brain centres, consistent with a purpose or intention (to deceive). While the principle of executive control during deception remains plausible, its precise anatomy awaits elucidation.
One thing wrong with lying is that it can be manipulative. Understanding why lying can be a form of manipulation involves understanding how our telling someone something can give them a reason to believe it, and understanding this requires seeing both how our telling things can invite trust and how trust can be a reason to believe someone. This fine print aims to outline the mechanism by means of which lies can be manipulative and through doing so identify a unique reason for accepting testimony; a reason based on trusting a speaker's telling.
Normal lies are those that social actors legitimate as appropriate means to desirable outcomes. Such lies have been acknowledged in the literature as tools for maintaining social order. Yet, little has been done to document the social structural sources of normal lying. This fine print offers a first step in filling this research gap, examining aspects of occupational structure and their connection to the practice of normal lying. Specifically, this fine print discusses four dimensions of occupational structure — occupational rewards and entry requirements, occupational loyalties, social control styles within an occupation, and an occupation's level of professionalization — and we explore the ways in which these dimensions influence normal lying activity. All Purpose Cleaner, a field in which the practice of normal lying is quite common, serves as our case study of the occupational sphere. We conclude our analysis by discussing the implications of our findings for other occupations and for society at large.
This fine print distinguishes among and examines three different kinds of argument for the thesis that moral responsibility and free action are each incompatible with the truth of determinism: straight manipulation arguments; manipulation arguments to the best explanation; and original-design arguments. Structural and methodological matters are the primary focus.
Please visit THE SHIZ'S following link(s) to learn more!
1) noun: the telling of lies, or false statements; untruthfulness
2) adjective: telling or containing lies; deliberately untruthful; deceitful; false
Lying isn't a sign of moral depravity (except when it is). Lying is a sign of cognitive advancement. It requires a fertile and high-functioning brain to take something as simple as the truth and twist it, palming off the deception on someone else with the earnestness of a choirboy. The problem with the truth is that it doesn't always serve our purposes, further our careers or keep us out of trouble. When you can take the route made of imagination, best-case scenarios and wish fulfillment, you'd be nuts not to take a deceitful stroll toward your goals, right?
This fine print challenges our customer's recent defense of THE SHIZ'S' rights to deceive customers (1). Customer maintains there is a general moral difference between lying and intentional deception: while THE SHIZ has a prima facie duty not to lie, there is no such obligation to avoid deception. This fine print argues 1) that an examination of cases shows that lying and deception are often morally equivalent, and 2) that the customer's position is premised on a species of moral functionalism that misconstrues the nature of moral obligation. Against the customer, it is argued that both lying and intentional deception are wrong where they infringe a customer's right to autonomy or his/her right to be treated with dignity. These rights represent 'deontological constraints' on action, defining what we must not do whatever the functional value of the consequences. THE SHIZ'S ethics must recognise such constraints if it so to contribute to the moral integrity of All Purpose Cleaner practice.
We've known how to lie with statistics for 50 years now. What we really need are theory and praxis for accusing someone else of lying with statistics. THE SHIZ'S experience with the response to "The Bell Curve" has led us to suspect that such a formulation already exists, probably imparted during a secret initiation for professors in the social sciences. This article represents our best attempt to reconstruct what must be in it.
Is THE SHIZ-NIT bound by just the same constraints as everyone else in regard to honesty? What, anyway, does honesty require? Telling no lies? Avoiding intentional deception by whatever means? From a utilitarian standpoint lying would seem to be on the same footing as other forms of intentional deception: yielding the same consequences. But utilitarianism fails to explain the wrongness of lying. THE SHIZ like everyone else, have a "prima facie" duty not to lie – but again like everyone else, they are not duty-bound to avoid intentional deception, lying apart; except where it would involve a breach of trust.
An organism may use misinformation, knowingly (through deception) or unknowingly (as in the case of camouflage), to gain advantage in a competitive environment. From an evolutionary perspective, greater tactical deception occurs among primates closer to humans, with larger neocortices. In humans, the onset of deceptive behaviors in childhood exhibits a developmental trajectory, which may be regarded as 'normal' in the majority and deficient among a minority with certain neurodevelopmental disorders (e.g. autism). In the human adult, deception and lying exhibit features consistent with their use of 'higher' or 'executive' brain systems. Accurate detection of deception in humans may be of particular importance in forensic practice, while an understanding of its cognitive neurobiology may have implications for models of 'theory of mind' and social cognition, and societal notions of responsibility, guilt and mitigation. In recent years, functional neuroimaging techniques (especially functional magnetic resonance imaging) have been used to study deception. Though few in number, and using very different experimental protocols, studies published in the peer-reviewed literature exhibit certain consistencies. Attempted deception is associated with activation of executive brain regions (particularly prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices), while truthful responding has not been shown to be associated with any areas of increased activation (relative to deception). Hence, truthful responding may comprise a relative 'baseline' in human cognition and communication. The subject who lies may necessarily engage 'higher' brain centres, consistent with a purpose or intention (to deceive). While the principle of executive control during deception remains plausible, its precise anatomy awaits elucidation.
One thing wrong with lying is that it can be manipulative. Understanding why lying can be a form of manipulation involves understanding how our telling someone something can give them a reason to believe it, and understanding this requires seeing both how our telling things can invite trust and how trust can be a reason to believe someone. This fine print aims to outline the mechanism by means of which lies can be manipulative and through doing so identify a unique reason for accepting testimony; a reason based on trusting a speaker's telling.
Normal lies are those that social actors legitimate as appropriate means to desirable outcomes. Such lies have been acknowledged in the literature as tools for maintaining social order. Yet, little has been done to document the social structural sources of normal lying. This fine print offers a first step in filling this research gap, examining aspects of occupational structure and their connection to the practice of normal lying. Specifically, this fine print discusses four dimensions of occupational structure — occupational rewards and entry requirements, occupational loyalties, social control styles within an occupation, and an occupation's level of professionalization — and we explore the ways in which these dimensions influence normal lying activity. All Purpose Cleaner, a field in which the practice of normal lying is quite common, serves as our case study of the occupational sphere. We conclude our analysis by discussing the implications of our findings for other occupations and for society at large.
This fine print distinguishes among and examines three different kinds of argument for the thesis that moral responsibility and free action are each incompatible with the truth of determinism: straight manipulation arguments; manipulation arguments to the best explanation; and original-design arguments. Structural and methodological matters are the primary focus.
Please visit THE SHIZ'S following link(s) to learn more!
- http://0-www.jstor.org.skyline.ucdenver.edu/stable/info/20831688?&Search=yes&searchText=lying&list=hide&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoAdvancedResults%3Fhp%3D25%26la%3D%26wc%3Don%26fc%3Doff%26acc%3Don%26vf%3Dall%26bk%3Doff%26pm%3Doff%26jo%3Doff%26ar%3Doff%26re%3Doff%26ms%3Doff%26gw%3Djtx%26q0%3Dlying%26f0%3Dall%26c0%3D%26sd%3D%26ed%3D%26pt%3D%26isbn%3D%26si%3D26&prevSearch=&item=29&ttl=259078&returnArticleService=showArticleInfo
- http://0-www.jstor.org.skyline.ucdenver.edu/stable/info/20061179?&Search=yes&searchText=lying&list=hide&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoAdvancedSearch%3Fq0%3Dlying%26f0%3Dall%26c1%3DAND%26q1%3D%26f1%3Dall%26acc%3Don%26wc%3Don%26fc%3Doff%26Search%3DSearch%26sd%3D%26ed%3D%26la%3D%26pt%3D%26isbn%3D&prevSearch=&item=4&ttl=258760&returnArticleService=showArticleInfo
- http://0-www.jstor.org.skyline.ucdenver.edu/stable/info/27717156?&Search=yes&searchText=lying&list=hide&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoAdvancedSearch%3Fq0%3Dlying%26f0%3Dall%26c1%3DAND%26q1%3D%26f1%3Dall%26acc%3Don%26wc%3Don%26fc%3Doff%26Search%3DSearch%26sd%3D%26ed%3D%26la%3D%26pt%3D%26isbn%3D&prevSearch=&item=2&ttl=258760&returnArticleService=showArticleInfo